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Part I of this Essay lays out the role of Greece and Turkey in the security of the Balkans. Part
II describes three areas of dispute between Greece and Turkey. Part III concludes with hopes that
the two countries will move towards settling their differences.




March 12, 1997, marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Tru-
man doctrine.' On that March day in 1947, President Harry
Truman announced the doctrine that had profound implica-
tions for U.S. policy towards Europe in general and the Balkans
in particular. The Truman doctrine set the parameters for U.S.
policy during the Cold War and also enabled Greece to resist
Soviet expansionism and remain part of the free world. Equally
important is the fact that the Truman doctrine ushered in a new
era in Greek-U.S. relations. Since then, Greece and the United
States have forged an even closer alliance. Moreover, when
Greece joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2
("NATO") in 1952, it became an integral part of the Western
alliance and defense system.
The 1947 alliance between Greece and the United States
only served to underscore a relationship that went back many
decades. The example of the U.S. revolution encouraged the
Greeks when they rebelled against the Ottoman Empire in 1821.
The philhellenism of the Founding Fathers and the deep admi-
ration of the United States for Greece's war of independence
constitute the beginning of the historical ties that bind together
modem Greece and the United States. The bonds between the
two countries were further strengthened when Greece and the
United States fought side by side in the two World Wars. It is
this common fight for freedom that cemented the friendship be-
tween the Greek and the U.S. peoples. The Truman doctrine
and the NATO alliance only came to reconfirm this traditionally
close friendship and the shared values between Greece and the
United States.
Greece and another NATO member, Turkey, however, have
not had as amicable and cooperative a relationship as that of the
* Ambassador of Greece to the United States.
1. Exec. Order No. 9857, 3 C.F.R. 646 (1943-1948), reprinted in 61 Stat. 103 (1947).
2. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter
NATO Treaty].
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United States and Greece. Currently Turkey has provoked
Greece on a number of fronts, including the policy pursued in
the Balkans, violations by Turkey of Greek airspace, the Dodeca-
nese islet of Imia, which Turkey mistakenly claims as its own, the
contentious issue of Cyprus, and the mistreatment by Turkey of
the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and of the Greek
minority residing in Turkey. Ultimately, Greece is determined
to resolve these issues through recognized principles of interna-
tional law, but is thwarted by Turkey's truculence and refusal to
cooperate and work within the parameters of international insti-
tutions such as the United Nations and the International Court
of Justice ("ICJ").
I. THE BALKAN PREDICAMENT
The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 signaled the end of the
Cold War and the triumph of the western alliance and its under-
lying value system of freedom, democracy, human rights, and
free market economy. The end of the Cold War also meant the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist regimes in the
Balkans. These developments have changed Greece's regional
environment dramatically and posed new opportunities, as well
as challenges, for the Greek Government. In this respect, Greek-
Turkish relations will be better understood if their Balkan di-
mension is also examined. Historically, both Orthodox Christi-
anity and Islam have influenced the Balkans: solid blocks of
Christian communities interspersed with Muslim enclaves consti-
tute the bulk of the Balkan population. The roots of present day
Balkan conflicts, the war in Bosnia especially, can also be traced
to the re-awakening of ethnic and religious loyalties that Com-
munist regimes suppressed for so long.
The collapse of Yugoslavia and the ensuing tragic war in
Bosnia have threatened to destabilize the whole Balkan region.
The Balkans, moreover, are Europe's Achilles heel and Balkan
instability and wars tend to spill over to Europe. Consequently,
Balkan security is directly linked to European security and any
threat to Balkan security threatens Europe as well. European se-
curity is the primary reason for the United States' participation
in the settlement of the Bosnian conflict, and its continued in-
volvement in the Balkans, both directly and through the NATO
alliance.
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Stability in the Balkans in general and in Bosnia in particu-
lar has not taken root, however, because several sources of ten-
sion still exist in this inherently volatile region. Ethnic and reli-
gious rivalries and the dislocations caused from the transition
from Communism to free market economies continue to pose a
serious threat to Balkan stability. Most Balkan countries with the
exception of Greece, are experiencing domestic upheaval. Alba-
nia, the new Yugoslav Federation, Bosnia, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, and Bulgaria are faced with serious
socio-economic problems linked to this transition process. Tur-
key is also experiencing a multifaceted and profound domestic
crisis that is accompanied by economic and social dislocations,
political repression, and widespread human rights violations.3
The ongoing civil strife resulting from the Kurdish minority
question is at the epicenter of the domestic crisis which in turn
affects Turkey's overall international behavior.
Greece, on the other hand, stands out in the Balkans as a
stable democracy with a free enterprise system and domestic
tranquility. Greece is also the only Balkan country that is a mem-
ber of the European Union,4 NATO,5 and the Western Euro-
pean Union.6 As such, Greece is in the unique position to serve
as the anchor of stability and an engine of economic growth for
the whole Balkan region. It is no accident, therefore, that
Greece is already playing a very important role in the transfor-
3. See Eric Rouleau, Turkey Beyond Ataturk, 103 FOREIGN POL'Y 70-87 (1996) (analyz-
ing current crisis in Turkey). Eric Rouleau is the former Ambassador of France to Tur-
key. See also U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TuR-y, HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (1995) (reporting
on state of human rights in Turkey); GULBAHAR GUNDUZ & ALu EKBER KAYA, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, TuRKEY (1996); HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUM. RTS. WORLD REP. 1994
234-246 (1993).
4. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.j. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty Establishing the Eu-
ropean Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
(Cmd. 5179-II) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended ly Single European Act, O.J. L
169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Offl Pub. Off. 1987)).
5. NATO Treaty, supra note 2.
6. Treaty for the Collaboration in Economic, Social, and Cultural Matters and for
Collective Self-defense, Mar. 17, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51, modified y Protocol Modifying
and Completing Treaty Between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland for Collaboration in Economic, So-
cial, and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-defense, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S.
342 [hereinafter Treaty on Western European Union]. Protocol on the Accession to
the Western European Union of the Republic of Greece, Nov. 20, 1992.
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mation of former Communist Balkan economies into free enter-
prise systems. Greek businessmen, entrepreneurs, and investors
are assisting in the formation of a new Bulgarian, Rumanian,
and Albanian entrepreneurial class.
In the security field, Greece has signed defense cooperation
agreements with Bulgaria and Rumania and is developing closer
security ties with Albania. From the start of the Bosnian conflict,
Greece adopted a principled stand regarding the peaceful settle-
ment of the crisis. For the last four years, Greek humanitarian
aid to Bosnia and to all the suffering peoples of former Yugosla-
via, irrespective of their ethnicity or religion, has been quite sub-
stantial. Moreover, Greece actively and repeatedly undertook
diplomatic initiatives, supported by its partners and allies, with
the view of ending the war. Following the Dayton peace ac-
cords,7 Greece sent a military contingent to Bosnia to serve
alongside U.S. troops as part of the International Force
("IFOR"), the Bosnia peacekeeping force.8 In addition, Greece
is assisting in the reconstruction effort through economic and
technical aid.
Given the current and potential instability in the Balkans, it
is evident that Greece's role is essential for peace and prosperity
in the area. Furthermore, any threat to Greece's security would
undermine the security and stability of the Balkans. Such
destabilization is certainly against the interests of the region, the
western alliance, and the United States. The prospect of re-
gional destabilization, however, continues to loom because
Greece is confronted with a growing security threat from its east-
ern Balkan neighbor, Turkey.
II. 'GREECE AND TURKEY: AREAS OF DISPUTE
The Bosnian Conflict, Soviet expansionism during the Cold
War, and two World Wars fought primarily on European and
Balkan soil, serve as reminders of the cost to humanity of totali-
tarianism and of territorial revisionism. Since the end of the
7. Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, of the Agreement on General Frame-
work Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (implementing Dayton Peace
Accords) 15 Dec., 1995, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia, and
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
8. See S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1031 (1995) (endorsing deployment of NATO-led multinational peace implementation
force).
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Second World War, the United States, Canada, and the Euro-
pean continent extending from the Pyrenees to the Urals, have
agreed that the change of European borders by force or the
threat of force is absolutely unacceptable. Yet Turkey, a member
of NATO and aspiring member of the European Union, using
convoluted arguments in direct violation of international law
and treaties, has embarked on a policy of territorial revisionism
against Greece. For over two decades, Turkey has threatened to
use force in order to change the status quo in the Aegean.
Over the last seven decades, the Treaty of Lausanne, signed
in 1923, offered the main legal framework that regulated bilat-
eral relations between Greece and Turkey.' A number of other
multilateral treaties and agreements such as the North Atlantic
Treaty' ° and the Treaty of Rome" also define Greek-Turkish re-
lations. Adherence to these treaties and agreements and respect
for international law, have guided Greece's behavior vis-a-vis its
neighbors in general and its policies towards Turkey in particu-
lar. Turkey on the other hand, has chosen the path of challeng-
ing and violating these treaties and subsequently, the spirit be-
hind the European security system. As a result, tension and re-
peated crises have characterized Greek-Turkish relations.
Turkey's policy of territorial revisionism is not unrelated to
the deepening crisis that threatens the country's social order
and the cohesion of its political system. Faced with mounting
domestic problems, the Turkish military establishment, which re-
mains the final arbiter of the political system, looks for external
diversions as an outlet for the accumulated domestic pressures.
Greece, a historic rival that has managed to create better pros-
pects for its people, offers the ideal target that can keep the
Turkish public preoccupied with the external threat to the na-
tion. Greece does not entertain any territorial claims against
Turkey and poses no military threat to its eastern neighbor of
sixty-one million' 2 with the largest standing army in NATO after
9. Treaty of Peace with Turkey, July 24, 1923, 28 U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter Treaty of
Lausanne]. The Treaty of Lausanne regulates the status of the northeastern Aegean
islands at the exit from the Dardanelles. Id.
10. NATO Treaty, supra note 2.
11. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1) in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC OfFl Pub. Off. 1987).
12. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 215 (1997) (reporting that
Turkey currently has population of 61.1 million).
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the United States.
The Greece-Turkey relationship illustrates a recurrent phe-
nomenon in contemporary international affairs: a heavily armed
country, Turkey, with a past of military aggression against its
neighbors, seeks to revise the status quo at the expense of one of
its neighbors, Greece. Three main areas evidence Turkish revi-
sionism, notably the Aegean, the minorities question, and the
Cyprus dispute.
A. The Aegean
1. The Aegean Continental Shelf
The Aegean is an archipelago dotted with islands and islets
home to Greek populations for millennia. The historical course
of the Greek people and Hellenic civilization are linked inextri-
cably to the Aegean. Thus, the Aegean Sea, its islands, and their
history and culture are embedded deeply in the Greek psyche.
Two major treaties govern the territorial status quo in the
Aegean, notably the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne13 and the 1947
Treaty of Paris. 4 Turkey had accepted these international trea-
ties for many decades before it suddenly decided to challenge
the situation in Aegean in the fall of 1973. At the time, Turkey
disputed Greece's right to engage in mineral or oil exploration
within Greek territorial waters and on the continental shelf of
the northern Aegean island of Thasos. Subsequently, Turkey es-
calated its revisionist demands in the Aegean to include Greek
airspace and territorial waters. Most recently, Turkey challenged
Greek sovereignty over part of the Dodecanese islands.
These challenges to Greek sovereign rights in the Aegean
have been carried out through the threat of use of military force.
In the mid-1970s, Turkey created the Fourth Army of the Ae-
gean, and stationed it opposite Greece's Aegean islands. 5 This
army, which is not assigned to NATO, is equipped with the larg-
est non-oceangoing landing force in the world. 6 It is equipped
13. Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 9.
14. Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, TIAS 1648; 4 Bevans
311, 49 and 50 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter Treaty of Paris]. Pursuant to the Treaty of Paris,
Italy ceded the Dodecanese Islands to Greece.
15. See Sean Boyne, Tension Riding High in the Aegean, 8JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV. 3,
120-125 (1996) (reporting on deployment of Turkey's lVth Army on Turkey's western
border which faces the Greek Aegean islands).
16. Id.
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with 110 ships 7 and landing crafts that in a short period of time
can transfer and deploy 400 armored vehicles and 17,000 troops.
The operational objective of this force is undoubtedly offensive,
aiming at the invasion of the Greek islands. Consequently, and
in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter," Greece has
taken certain measures of self-defense in order to protect the
territorial integrity of its islands.
The question of the continental shelf, raised by Turkey in
1973, remains unanswered. Consequently, Greece and Turkey
nearly went to war in 1976 and 1987 following Turkish attempts
to engage in oil exploration inside Greek territorial waters. The
Greek position regarding the Aegean continental shelf and
Greece's right to engage in oil exploration, is firmly based in
international law, specifically the 1958 Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf19 and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention ("LOS
Convention"). ° Confident that it is acting in accordance with
international law, Greece has accepted that the question of de-
lineation of the continental shelf be submitted to adjudication at
the ICJ in the Hague. As of the present, Turkey has not agreed
to this proposal.
2. The Aegean Air Space
In 1931, Greece established a ten mile airspace zone in the
Aegean over a territorial sea of six miles. For over forty years,
Turkey recognized the ten mile Greek airspace, even after the
ratification of the 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation. 21
17. Id.
18. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51. Article 51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Se-
curity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
Id.
19. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1959, 15 U.S.T. 471, TIAS No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into forceJune 10, 1964).
20. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 [hereinafter LOS Convention].
21. International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, EAS
487, 3 Bevans 916, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
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Following the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, however, the
Turkish air force began challenging the ten mile zone. By the
mid-1980s, Turkey had engaged in massive violations of Greek
airspace. Turkey's argument has been that Greece's airspace
should not be ten miles but should coincide with the six mile
limit of territorial waters. Therefore, the argument continues,
Turkey can challenge Greek airspace within the margin of six to
ten miles. Turkish fighter jets, nonetheless, have been violating
Greek airspace inside the six mile limit, often flying directly over
Greek islands.22 On occasion, Turkish F-16s and F-4s fly over
Greek airports in the Aegean islands." During 1995, for in-
stance, Turkish warplanes violated Greek airspace 413 times and
Athens Flight Information Region 455 times. 4 Over the first
eight months of 1995, sixty-six percent of Turkish violations of
Greek national airspace were within the six mile limit. 5 Sixteen
percent of these violations involved direct flights of Turkish war-
planes over the territory of Greek islands such as Lesvos, Chios,
Samos, Kos, and Rhodes. 6 Eighteen percent of these air viola-
tions were within the six to ten mile limit.27 Greek fighter jets
routinely intercept the Turkish warplanes that violate Greek air-
space and escort them out of the airspace. ' On many occasions
the Greek fighter planes have to engage armed Turkish planes,
increasing the likelihood of an accident or of a broader military
confrontation.
3. The Territorial Waters
In addition to airspace, Turkey is challenging Greece's terri-
torial waters. Since 1936, Greece has claimed six nautical miles
of territorial sea. Since 1964, Turkey has extended its territorial
waters to twelve nautical miles in the Mediterranean and the
Black Sea, excluding the Aegean region.28 According to the
22. Boyne, supra note 15, at 125 (setting forth dispute between Greece and Turkey
regarding extension of Greece's airspace).
23. See id. (reporting that Turkey does not submit flight plans to Athens for mili-
tary flights over Greece, and that, subsequently, Greece sends up its own aircraft to
intercept and identify).
24. Greek Ministry of National Defense, Airspace Violations Data, July 12, 1996; Vio-






1958 Law of the Sea Convention,2 9 states have the right to ex-
tend their territorial waters to twelve miles.30 This was further
consolidated into the body of international law in November
1994 when the 1982 LOS Convention came into effect."1 The
LOS Convention confirmed the right of states to extend their
territorial waters to twelve miles.3 2 On May 31, 1995, the Greek
Parliament ratified the 1982 LOS Convention while Turkey has
yet to ratify it."3 At the time of the ratification, the Greek Gov-
ernment announced that it would not automatically extend
Greek territorial waters to twelve miles. In accordance with in-
ternational practice, Greece also reserved the right to extend its
territorial waters when it deemed necessary. Thus, Greek behav-
ior was both responsible and in full compliance with interna-
tional law.
Turkey's reaction to the LOS Convention and the Greek
Government was bellicose. In addition to refusing to ratify the
LOS Convention, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, on June
8, 1995, adopted a unanimous resolution stating that if Greece
extended its territorial waters to twelve miles, this would consti-
tute casus belli. 4 Former Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller
repeatedly threatened Greece with war if it extended its territo-
rial waters not just in the Aegean but anywhere.
The Turkish argument against Greece's right to extend ter-
ritorial waters is that the Aegean Sea represents special circum-
stances3 5 and that if Greece extends its territorial waters it will
29. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 28, 1958,
516 U.N.T.S. 205, 52 A.J.I.L. 834.
30. See id., art. 1, 516 U.N.T.S. 206-208 (leaving determination of width of territo-
rial sea to discretion of states in accordance with international law). Article 1 of the
1958 Law of the Sea Convention states that "1. The sovereignty of a state extends, be-
yond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, de-
scribed as the territorial sea. 2. This sovereignty is exercised subject to the provisions of
these articles and to other rules of international law." Id.
31. LOS Convention, supra note 20. The Convention had stipulated that it would
enter into force only after sixty ratifications or accessions. Id., art. 308, at 21 I.L.M.
1327.
32. Id., art. 3, at 21 I.L.M. 1272.
33. Boyne, supra note 15.
34. See id. (reporting on Turkish parliamentary decision of June 8, 1995 in which
Turkey threatened Greece with war if Greece extended its territorial waters in Aegean
from six to twelve nautical miles).
35. See id. (positing that Turkey has not signed 1982 LOS Convention because it
regards certain provisions covering Aegean as inappropriate and that Aegean is special
case).
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transform the Aegean into a Greek lake.3 6 There is no base, how-
ever, to this argument. Greece has repeatedly pointed out that
international law provides the instruments, including innocent
passage, guarantees for freedom of navigation, for peaceful reso-
lution of legal issues. Despite all this, Turkey persists in its poli-
cies of repudiating the law and advancing the argument of war.
4. The Imia Crisis
Turkey's revisionism, however, does not only pertain to
Greek airspace and territorial waters. Lately, it has been ex-
tended to Greek territory proper. In January 1996, Turkey
openly disputed Greek sovereignty over the Dodecanese islet of
Imia. It was the first time that Turkey laid direct claim over
Greek territory. The legal status of the Aegean islands, includ-
ing the Dodecanese, has been determined by the 1923 Treaty of
Lausanne 7 and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.38 Yet Turkey de-
cided that the Imia islet near the Dodecanese island of Kalymnos
was a Turkish possession named Kardak. This provocative Turk-
ish claim led to a major Aegean crisis at the end of January
1996.11 A Greco-Turkish war was averted at the last minute fol-
lowing the personal intervention of U.S. President Bill Clinton.40
In the aftermath of the Imia crisis, the President of the
United States and the State Department called for the respect of
international law and existing treaties and opposed the use of
force or threat of force in the Aegean. Greece shares this princi-
pled approach to the problem. The United States also proposed
that the Imia issue be resolved peacefully through recourse to
the ICJ. Greece has also welcomed this proposal. Turkey, on
the other hand, is rejecting recourse to the ICJ.
Turkey not only rejected the available mechanisms for the
peaceful resolution of the Imia question, but it subsequently es-
calated its provocations against Greece. In February 1996,
Tansu Ciller questioned Greek sovereignty over another 1000
36. Id.
37. Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 9.
38. Treaty of Paris, supra note 14.
39. See Alliance Partners on the Rocks, but Aegean Tragedy Averted, 25 JANE's DEFENSE
WKLY. 6, at 17 (1996) (reporting on landing of Turkish commandos on islet of Imia and
of ensuing tensions between Greece and Turkey).
40. Id.
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Aegean islands and islets similar to Kardak or larger.41 A few
months later, in June 1996, Turkey disputed Greek sovereignty
over the island of Gavdos ("Gavdos claim"). The island of
Gavdos, located southwest of Crete, is 240 miles away from Tur-
key and is inhabited by a Greek population. This claim has been
so outrageous that President Clinton called upon Turkey to
avoid making "frivolous territorial claims" against Greece.42
The Gavdos claim, outrageous as it might be, demonstrates
that Turkish territorial revisionism is now out of control. As if to
prove the point, the Turkish air force escalated dramatically its
violations of Greek airspace. For the first six months of 1996
alone, Turkish warplanes violated Greek airspace 1096 times.43
Two Turkish fighter jets, in separate incidents, crashed in the
Aegean as the Greek air force pursued them. Increasingly,
therefore, Turkish revisionism and threat of force in the Aegean,
are transforming this region into a crisis area that is threatening
not only air navigation and the sea lanes but stability in the
Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean in general.
B. The Minorities Question
Since the mid 1950s, the question of the Greek minority in
Turkey and the Muslim minority in Greece have been a constant
irritant in Greco-Turkish relations, primarily because Turkey en-
gaged in repeated violations of the Treaty of Lausanne. The
Treaty of Lausanne provided for the exchange of populations
between Greece and Turkey and regulated and protected the
status of the remaining Greek minority in Turkey and the Mus-
lim minority in Greece, based on the principle of reciprocity.
Since the Treaty of Lausanne was called into force, Greece has
made every effort to observe the Treaty and has treated its Mus-
lim minority in Thrace well. Turkey, beginning in 1955, en-
gaged in the systematic persecution of its Greek minority.44 In
41. Alkis Kourkoylas, Ciller: Islet Issue Should be Treated as Casus Belli, ATHENS NEWS
AGENCY, Feb. 5, 1996.
42. President Clinton, Statement to the Greek American Community during 1996
Clinton/Gore Presidential Campaign (Oct. 19, 1996).
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing airspace violations by
Turkish military jets).
44. For an account of the fate of the Greek minority since 1955, see HELSINKI
WATCH, DENYING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHNIC IDENTITY, THE GREEKS OF TURKEY (1992)
[hereinafter DENYING HUMAN RIGHTS].
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1955, the Greek minority in Turkey was estimated at 100,000.
45
In 1951, the Muslim minority in Thrace was estimated at
108,000.46 This Muslim minority did not represent a homoge-
nous group but consisted of Turkic, Pomak, and Gypsy Muslims.
In disregard of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey lumped all these
ethnic groups together under the label "Turkish minority." At
present, there are only about 2500 Greeks left in Turkey, repre-
senting a community that "is dwindling, elderly and fright-
ened."4" On the other hand, the growing Muslim minority in
Greece is estimated at 125,000.48 During the September 22,
1996, elections, three Muslims were elected members of the
Greek Parliament,49 one under the ruling PASOK party, another
under the main opposition New Democracy party, and the third
under the Coalition of the Left party. These plain facts counter
the Turkish argument about the mistreatment of the Muslim mi-
nority in Greek Thrace exemplify the status and treatment of
minorities by the two countries.
The status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constanti-
nople also relates to the minority question. This international
religious institution represents a Christian tradition of sixteen
centuries. As such, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is not just a
body representing the Greek Orthodox. The heritage of world
Christianity is intertwined with the historical experience of the
Patriarchate, its trials and tribulations through the centuries.
The Ecumenical Patriarch is the spiritual leader of 250 mil-
lion Orthodox Christians worldwide. Regrettably, Turkey has
not appreciated the fact that it plays host to such a venerable
religious institution. As such, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is en-
titled to basic freedoms and respect on the part of Turkish au-
thorities so that it can perform its spiritual mission. Under the
false pretext of secularism, successive Turkish governments, have
imposed severe restrictions on the Patriarchate. As a result, the
Ecumenical Patriarch is forced to live under conditions of con-
45. See Alexis Alexandris, To Meionotiko Zetema, 1954-1987, in ELLINO-TURKIKES
SCHESEIS: 1923-1987 449, 552-95 (Alexis Alexandris et. al. eds., 1988).
46. ALEXiS ALEXANDRIS, THE GREEK MINORrrY OF ISTANBUL AND GREEK-TURKISH RF
LATIONS, 1918-1974, 307-15 (1983) [hereinafter THE GREEK MINORITY OF ISTANBUL].
47. DENYING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 1 .
48. THE GREEK MINORrIY OF ISTANBUL, supra note 46, at 309.
49. See Muslim Minority Returns to Greek Parliament, Agence France Presse, Sept. 24,
1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Non-US file (discussing election of three repre-
sentatives of Turkish minority to Greek Parliament).
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stant harassment.5" In 1971, the Theological School of Chalki
was shut down. Without a theological seminary, the center of
world Orthodoxy cannot produce a new clerical hierarchy be-
cause Turkish law dictates that the Patriarch should be a Turkish
citizen. Moreover, Turkish authorities are attempting to reduce
the Patriarch to a local church leader of a dwindling community
and refuse to acknowledge that he is indeed the spiritual leader
of all Greek Orthodox as well as of world Orthodoxy. Despite
the increasing intolerance, the Ecumenical Patriarch continues
to perform religious services and to relay his message of peace
and understanding.
C. The Cyprus Impasse
Since July 1974, when Turkey invaded and occupied the
northern part or thirty-eight percent of the territory of Cyprus,
this little island republic has been partitioned by the force of
arms. A 35,000 strong Turkish occupation army, keeps Cyprus
divided.51 The protracted Cyprus conflict started in 1955, when
the Greek Cypriots, representing eighty-two percent of the pop-
ulation, engaged in an anti-colonial struggle against the English
aimed at securing the right to self-determination. 2 In 1960, a
compromise agreement granting independence to Cyprus was
reached. This agreement, however, was short lived. Following a
constitutional crisis in 1963, violence broke out between the
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. A United Nations
peacekeeping force ("UNFICYP") was dispatched to Cyprus in
1964 and is still there. 53
At present, twenty-two years after the Turkish invasion, and
over forty years since the Cyprus dispute began, the Cyprus con-
flict appears to be one of the most intractable worldwide. The
50. See THE GREEK MINORrY OF ISTANBUL, supra note 46, at 266-306. Regarding
Turkish pressures on the Ecumenical Patriarchate, see id.; DENYING HUMAN RIcHTS,
supra note 44, at 2-3, 18.
51. See Amy Truesdell, Nicosia Raises the Stakes on Cyprus, JANE'S INTELLMENCE REV.,
Apr. 1, 1996, at 166 (reporting that Turkey's military presence in Cyprus consists of
35,000 soldiers as supported by troops on Turkish mainland).
52. See generally Robert Stephens, CYPRuS: A PLACE OF ARMs (1966) (detailing Cyp-
riot history covering Ottoman period, British colonial rule, and independence period
up to 1965).
53. See S.C. Res. 186, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan-March 1964, 102-103, U.N. Doc. S/
5575 (1964) (providing legal basis to establish peace-keeping force in Cyprus with con-
sent of government of Cyprus).
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capital of Cyprus, Nicosia, remains the only capital of a U.N.
Member State that is divided by barbed wire and a Green Line of
empty streets and phantom buildings.
In terms of its international status, Cyprus has been a sover-
eign republic since 1960, and a member of the United Nations
and of the British Commonwealth. Cyprus also shares a customs
union with the European Union. Negotiations for full member-
ship to the European Union are expected to commence early
1998. The international community, including the United
States, recognizes only the legitimate Government of the Repub-
lic of Cyprus ("Cyprus") under President Glavkos Clerides. The
self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the oc-
cupied territory constitutes an illegal entity and is recognized
only recognized by Turkey.-4
Politically-free Cyprus, with an estimated population of
620,000, represents a genuine western democracy. It has a free
market economy that has performed a miracle since 1974. The
Turkish invasion shattered the Cypriot economy as seventy per-
cent of the Cyprus' economic resources came under Turkish oc-
cupation.55 Today, Cyprus enjoys a standard of living compara-
ble to that of the advanced European countries. Per capita in-
come is estimated at US$15,000. Cyprus seems ready to join the
European Union.
On the other side of the barbed wire separating Cyprus, lies
the Turkish occupied territory. Shortly after the 1974 invasion,
and in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention, 6 Turkey em-
54. S.C. Res. 541, U.N. SCOR, 38' Sess., 2500th mtg. at 15 (1983). According to
the November 18, 1983, U.N. Security Council Resolution 541, the unilateral declara-
tion of independence by the Turkish Cypriots "is legally invalid and [the Security Coun-
cil] calls for its withdrawal." Id. On May 11, 1984, the Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 550 which condemns "all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of
Ambassadors between Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leadership, declares them illegal and
invalid and calls for their immediate withdrawal." S.C. Res. 550, U.N. SCOR, 39"' Sess.,
2539"h mtg. at 12, 2 at 13 (1984). In the same Resolution, the Security Council "reiter-
ates the call upon all States not to recognize the purported State of the 'Turkish Repub-
lic of Northern Cyprus' set up by secessionist acts." Id., 2 at 13.
55. See Alex J. Kondonassis & Birol Yesilada, The Economy, in CYPRUS: A COUNTRY
STUDY 108 (Eric Solsten, ed.) (4th ed. 1993) (positing that Turkish invasion and occu-
pation of northern 37% of island severely disrupted economy of Republic of Cyprus).
Fragmentation of the market, massive displacement of approximately one-third of the
island's population, and the loss of important natural resources, devastated the econ-
omy. Id.
56. Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3364, 6 U.S.T. 3316.
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barked on a systematic policy of colonization to the dismay even
of the local Turkish Cypriot population. 7 Estimates today are
that illegal settlers from Turkey number nearly 85,000.8 This is
about equal to the Turkish Cypriots who have been emigrating
in increasing numbers. The economy of the occupied territory
suffers from chronic stagnation and relies on Turkish assistance.
Per capita income is estimated at less than US$3,000. Politically,
the Turkish army and the settlers play a dominant role in the
occupied territory. Being numerically far inferior from the com-
bined number of settlers and army personnel, the Turkish Cypri-
ots do not have control of their own affairs.59
III. TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT?
Is there a way out of this impasse that will put an end to the
occupation of Cyprus and safeguard peace while promoting co-
operation between Greece and Turkey? If international law was
the sole factor weighing in a Cyprus settlement, the answer
would be simple. The United Nations provides the legal frame-
work as well as the mechanisms towards a Cyprus settlement.
Since 1974, the United Nations has adopted numerous resolu-
tions calling for the "immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed
forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Re-
public of Cyprus" and for the "respect [of] the sovereignty, inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of Cyprus."6 ° Turkey, however,
57. See Report on the Demographic Structure of the Cypriot Communities (Rapporteur, Mr.
Cuco, Spain), Council of Europe, ADOC 6589, 1403-23/4/92-4-E. The colonization of
occupied Cyprus has been examined by the Council of Europe during a visit to Cyprus
by Alfonse Cuco, Rapporteur for the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demogra-
phy. Id. Between November 5-9, 1991, Mr. Cuco visited both free Cyprus and the occu-
pied territory in the north. Id. Subsequently, on April 13, 1992, Mr. Cuco submitted
his report to the Committee on Migration. Id. The report was adopted by 23 votes in
favor, 2 against, and 2 abstentions. The report documents that since the fall of 1974,
there has been mass and systematic colonization of occupied Cyprus by Turkish settlers.
Id. Nine years before the Cuco report to the Council of Europe, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted on May 13, 1983, Resolution 37/253 which "deplores all unilateral
actions that change the demographic structure of Cyprus." G.A. Res. 37/253, U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. 37/253 (1983).
58. See CYPRUS: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 250 (listing number of Turkish
Cypriots in 1972 at 78,000 and number in 1988 at 167,256).
59. See generally CHRISTOS P. IOANNIDES, IN TURKEY'S IMAGE: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF OCCUPIED CYPRUS INTO A TURmSH PROVINCE (1991) (describing Turkey's policy to-
wards Cyprus since 1950, role of Turkish military officers, and demographic and polit-
ical consequences of Turkish occupation).
60. S.C. Res. 353, U.N. SCOR, 29th Sess., 1781" mtg. at 7, 1 and 4 (1974); see
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has ignored all these resolutions. The United Nations has an
official representative in Cyprus who aims at facilitating a negoti-
ated settlement. Apparently, the U.N. framework and the efforts
of successive U.N. Secretary Generals have not been enough to
break a twenty-two year impasse.
In order to support this effort, successive U.S. Administra-
tions have set up a special diplomatic mechanism. President
Clinton has stepped up the level of his direct involvement in the
Cyprus issue and has appointed his own Special Envoy.6" The
U.S. diplomatic team working on this issue, has repeatedly shut-
tled among the capitals involved, in an effort to break the im-
passe.
Parallel to these efforts, however, there are other prospects
that can bring about a settlement. As Cyprus is about to embark
on negotiations to join the European Union, another opportu-
nity appears on the horizon. The integration of Cyprus into the
European Union would provide the Turkish side a strong incen-
tive to end the division of the island, especially since the primary
beneficiaries, economically and socially, will be the Turkish
Cypriots. Even though this step also offers Turkey an incentive
to support it, Turkey, so far, has actively opposed such a pros-
pect. Greece, on the other hand, has consistently encouraged
the European orientation not only of Cyprus but of Turkey as
well, with the full knowledge that it is in the best interest of both
countries and is bound to bring them closer together. It is in
this spirit, and despite the continued occupation of Cyprus, the
Turkish threats in the Aegean, and Turkey's poor human rights
record, that Greece agreed to a customs union between the Eu-
ropean Union and Turkey.
With regard to Greco-Turkish relations and the problems
created by Turkey's policies in the Aegean, it should be stated
once more that Greece actively and unequivocally seeks peace
and cooperation. The framework for the resolution of these dis-
S.C. Res. 357, U.N. SCOR, 29h Sess., 1792"d mtg., at 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/357 (reaffirm-
ing Resolution 353)(1974); G.A. Res. 3212, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. (1974); see also S.C.
Res. 367, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1820' mtg., at 1-2 (1975); GA. Res. 3395, U.N. GAOR
(1975); G.A. Res. 37/253, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/789 (1983); S.C. Res. 789,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. (1992).
61. See William Drozdiak, U.S. Role in Aegean Revives Doubts on EU, WASH. POST, Feb.
8, 1996 at A17 (reporting that Clinton appointed New York Lawyer Richard Beattie as
Special Envoy to Cyprus); See also Elizabeth Neuffer, Diplomats Turn to Cyprus Question as
Tensions Increase, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 1996 at A2.
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putes is already in place. It is provided by the fundamental prin-
ciples of international law and existing treaties, namely the re-
spect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states as well
as abstention from any threat or use of force. These principles
constitute the only solid foundation upon which Greece and
Turkey can build their relationship.
It is in this spirit and within the European Union, NATO,
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
that Greece has undertaken several initiatives, bearing in mind
the challenges posed by the post-Cold War Europe and the
Balkans. For that purpose, Greece has made specific proposals
to promote peaceful ways of addressing international disputes
and of safeguarding the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the
inviolability of borders of the states participating in the interna-
tional legal order.
Greece is determined to defend its sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity, always adhering to the letter and spirit of interna-
tional law. At the same time, the Greek people who have suf-
fered so much from war throughout this century, have a great
reserve of good will. If Turkey puts asides its expansionist visions
and institutes real democratic reforms, the road to the European
Union will be wide open. Then, Greece and Turkey, in a spirit
of cooperation and conciliation will be able to chart ajoint path
towards the twenty-first century, a path leading to peace, secur-
ity, and prosperity for their peoples and the region as a whole.
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